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From the Editor
In this issue . . .
The Parameters’ staff is still basking in the overwhelming response to
the 40th Anniversary edition of the journal. Accolades from around the globe
have confirmed just how much readers appreciated the historical tour through
the journal’s past. As with any edition, however, there are those who find an issue
wanting for any number of reasons. Several of the responders suggested that
we may have purposely omitted a number of the more recent articles impacting
today’s strategic environment. I can assure that small group of nonbelievers
that selections were based solely on statistics and editorial archives. In an effort
to ensure that we had in fact “chosen wisely,” we reviewed the selection process
and were immediately struck by the number of articles that missed selection
by just a few percentage points, especially a number of the more contemporary
manuscripts. We have heard the clarion call and recognize it is only just that we
share the most popular articles of the past decade. We hope you will appreciate,
as we have, the wisdom, insight, and forethought presented.
From Thomas Adams’s 2001 article “Future Warfare and the Decline
of Human Decisionmaking” to Richard Lacquement’s 2011 offering of
“Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” readers were provided with
insight regarding the challenges and initiatives impacting America’s military.
Authors examined a plethora of questions related to the international environment and the appropriate role for the US military. Would technology offset the
need for maneuver warfare and “boots on the ground”? What is the appropriate
role for the world’s last remaining superpower in ensuring world peace and
tranquility? These are but a few of the conundrums that authors such as Richard
Hooker examined. Hooker’s “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American
Civil-Military Relations” (2004), and his 2005 manuscript, “Beyond Vom
Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War,” provided answers to a
number of these questions. His work, along with Ralph Peters’s 2004 article “In
Praise of Attrition,” and Michael O’Hanlon’s offering of that year, “The Need to
Increase the Size of the Deployable Army,” addressed critical issues related to
the employment of military force in the modern era. What is now accepted as
an underlying principle in our strategic lexicon was P. H. Liotta’s examination
of “Chaos as Strategy,” a thesis that was considered purely hypothetical when
introduced in 2002.
How insightful can one person be? At the same time Liotta was asking
readers to understand chaos as a strategy, William Hawkins was prophesying the future of America’s Army in “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan.”
Readers need to remember that these were the early days of our intervention
into Afghanistan. We were a nation at war against an enemy that dared violate
the sanctity of our homeland—an enemy that appeared almost immune to the
application of overwhelming military force. These were asymmetric threats
that many in the leadership of the nation and our armed forces insisted could
be met through the limited application of airpower, a few Special Forces, and
some light ground forces (preferably foreign auxiliaries). There was no longer a
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requirement for capable maneuver forces. These were the days before “surges”
and the successes that combined arms teams would eventually reap. Hawkins
concludes his prophesy with a profound admonishment—as a nation we need
to learn from history and understand that asymmetrical strategies cut both
ways—and it is always better to be stronger than weaker when waging war.
If there is one theme that dominated the military genre of the past
decade, it was an attempt to comprehend the role played by insurgents and how
best to counter their impact. Primary to this discussion was an analysis of the
Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) manual, FM 3-24. As with any
new entry to the doctrine and strategy arenas, the manual and its basic tenets
received as much criticism as acclaim. Frank Hoffman’s 2007 analysis of the
manual and its supporting principles, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” was
instrumental in inspiring the dialogue that continues to this day. The author,
critical of the “classical school” of thought related to insurgencies, provided
readers with an understanding of the need to revise classical COIN principles
if we are to successfully resolve the realities of today’s strategic environment.
Following Hoffman’s analysis was Steven Metz’s “New Challenges and Old
Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency.” The author took the US
military, and particularly the Army, to task for forgetting the counterinsurgency lessons of the 1960s, 80s, and 90s. Metz recalls the prevailing belief of
the time was that these relics of the Cold War would pose little challenge in the
“new world order” of the twenty-first century. As a result, professional military
education and doctrine shifted almost exclusively to the new requirement for
“peacekeeping.” This would all come to an end one September morning. The
author suggests that as the military struggled to quickly regain the counterinsurgency capabilities of the twentieth century, it failed to comprehend that
these new threats were distinct from the insurgencies of the past. America
was once again deriving new strategies from old conflicts, and again preparing to fight the last war. Following on the strategic theme of insurgencies and
counterinsurgency strategy was Gian Gentile’s 2009 contribution, “A Strategy
of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army.” Gentile assumed a contrarian’s view of the population-centric “way of war” outlined in FM 3-24.
He detailed his belief that the US military had moved beyond the manual’s
doctrine for countering insurgencies and was in the process of transforming
every soldier into a counterinsurgent. Population-centric counterinsurgency
was perverting the way wars should be fought, substituting a strategy devoid of
improvisation and practicality. The author espoused the view that populationcentric counterinsurgency was simply a military operation, nothing more, and
certainly not an overarching strategy.
We sincerely hope readers will appreciate these contemporary assessments of America’s political, social, and military affairs during the past decade.
Certainly, the value of the works presented is best appreciated when considered
in light of when the authors penned their manuscripts. Please enjoy the best of
Parameters from the past decade. – RHT q.
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